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The Japanese government has announced 213.1 billion yen in aid to Imabari Shipbuilding and others, the first tranche of a plan to double domestic shipbuilding capacity by 2035 — from 9 million gross tons to 18 million. Total commitment: roughly ¥1 trillion, combining public and private investment. The goal is to reclaim market share lost to South Korea and China, and the plan sits inside a broader strategy treating 17 sectors, including AI and semiconductors, as matters of economic security.
It is bold. It is audacious. On paper, it is exactly the kind of strategy I tell CEOs to pursue: a vision of the future stated first, worked backward to the present, undiluted by what currently seems reasonable.
There is only one problem. The one assumption girding the strategic rationale not only goes unstated, but is also fallacious. The plan’s own supporting documents admit the primary constraint on Japanese shipbuilding isn’t capacity. It’s skilled labor. This year, orders fell 15 percent — not because customers dried up, but because the workers to build the ships did not exist. And the government’s own solution to that shortage — automation, welding robots, AI-assisted outfitting — is only partly real. Welding automation works today. The harder task, outfitting a hull with pipes, cables, and electrical systems, is still the subject of active university research, not deployed technology. Meanwhile, Japan’s own industrial policy documents cite “programmer scarcity” as a reason automation itself is hard to scale — meaning the fix for the labor shortage requires labor that is also short.
Cranes get funded. Subsidies get disbursed and reported as progress. All of that is means. None of it is the end. The end is ships in the water, market share reclaimed. And the thing standing between the means and the end — a skilled workforce, arriving fast enough — is not being managed as a first-class part of the strategy. It is being treated as someone else’s problem, quietly assumed away.
So what is the government missing here?
No strategy survives first contact with the market
In strategy, arguing only all the reasons the strategy is right is a perilous approach without also enumerating all the reasons the strategy might be wrong. A strategy is only as good as the assumptions upon which it is based, because no initial strategy ever survives first contact with the market. The assumption underlying the government’s entire ¥1 trillion commitment is that capacity plus automation equals output. That assumption is not written down anywhere I can find. Nobody appears to own monitoring it. And it is already failing — the 15 percent order decline happened before the plan was even fully underway. The people inside this system are smart. They are not blind. But being smart is not the same as having someone whose job it is to say, out loud, in the room where it matters: here is the assumption we are all counting on, and here is how we will monitor it, by when we should be able to validate it, and our contingency if the assumptions turns out to be wrong.
Nobody is playing red team
If Japan had run a red-teaming exercise against this plan — the kind of exercise I run with my clients, asking “What will bring this strategy down?” — the answers would have surfaced immediately. Outfitting automation isn’t ready. The programmers needed to run the welding robots are themselves scarce. And separately, entirely unrelated visa tightening aimed at foreign entrepreneurs is damaging Japan’s reputation among exactly the AI and engineering talent this plan needs to import to fill the gap domestic reskilling won’t close fast enough. None of these are secret. They are sitting in plain sight across three different ministries’ documents. Nobody appears to have been tasked with connecting them.
The strategic “what” was without the “how.”
Japan’s leadership made the “what” decision correctly and boldly: yes, revive shipbuilding, yes, treat it as economic security, yes, commit real money. That is not the failure. The failure is that the how — coordinating METI’s capacity spending, the education ministry’s reskilling timeline, and Immigration’s visa policy around the one assumption they all depend on — was never delegated to anyone with authority over all three. Each ministry can report progress on its own piece. Nobody appears to have ownership of whether the disparate components achieve the desired result.
What this means for your business
Most of my readers do not run a country. You likely run a company, almost certainly witnessed or experienced a version of this government failure. Before your next strategy review, do three things this month, not next quarter. Now.
First, name the assumptions upon which your strategy is based, if you have not done so already. Take your current growth plan — expansion, a new product line, a market entry — and write down, in one sentence, the assumption it depends on most. Not the justification for the strategy. The thing that has to be true for it to work. You should be able to state an assumption in a simple sentence. If you cannot, then you have identified a gap in understanding.
Second, assign an owner to that assumption, separate from whoever owns delivering the plan. The person building the ships should not be the person deciding whether “enough skilled labor will materialize” is still true. Someone needs the job of watching that assumption and sounding the alarm the moment it wobbles — before the order numbers tell you, the way Japan’s just did. There is nothing with getting initial assumptions wrong. You want early warning when you do so you can take action to stay on course toward strategic objectives.
Third, run one red-team session before your next board meeting. Put your sharpest people in a room–especially the skeptics and the fearless contrarians willing to speak truth to power–and give them one instruction: find the fastest way to kill this strategy. Not soften it. Kill it. Tell me everything you think we might have gotten wrong. What they find will be uncomfortable–not just for you but for them, too. However, it will also be the single most useful hour you spend this quarter, because the alternative is finding out the hard way, in the market, after the money is already spent, and damage has been done.
Ambition without an owned assumption is not strategy. It is a wish with a budget attached. Japan just spent ¥1 trillion finding that out. There is no need to spend yours the same way.
Steve's New Video on YouTube
Japan’s ¥1 Trillion Bet: Capacity Isn’t the Constraint. Coherence Is.
Steve’s New Book: Strategy on Your Own Terms